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SUPREMeCOURT REVIEW (1972)
majority's analogy seems correct insofar as it re-
veals the Court's aversion to complete grants of
immunity. A non-immunizing case which themajor-
ity failed to cite, but which strongly adds to their
,argument, is United States v. Blue.Y In Blue, Jus-
tice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
Even if we .assume the Government had acquired
incriminating evidence in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, Blue would at most be entitled to
suppress the evidence and its fruits f they were
sought to be used against him at trial ... Our
numerous precedents ordering the exclusion of
such illegally obtained evidence assume im-
plicitly that the remedy does not extend to barring
the prosecution altogether. So drastic a step might
advance marginally some of the ends served by
exclusionary rules, but it would also increase to an
intolerable degree interference with the public
interest in having the guilty brought to book.5
The opinion in Blue strongly reinforces the notion
that absolute immunity from prosecution is not
necessary in order to protect an individual from
governmental overreach. Murphy and Kastigar are
consistent with Blue in that they indicate the
- 384 U.S. 251 (1966). Blue was charged in a crimi-
nal proceeding with wilfully attempting to evade in-
come taxes. The district court dismissed the indictment
on the grounds that defendant had been compelled to
be a witness against himself in that he was required to
file petitions for review of jeopardy assessment in tax
court. In holding that the indictment should not have
been dismissed, the Supreme Court reasoned that even
if the government had acquired incriminating evidence
in violation of the fifth amendment, defendant's remedy
would be to suppress the evidence and its fruits if they
were sought to be used against him at trial.
• AId. at 255.
Court's preference for relying on suppression of
evidence as the means by which to safeguard fifth
amendment rights.
Ultimately, the wisdom of the majority opinion
will depend upon whether the theory of immunity
from prosecutorial use is empirically sound, or
whether it is merely jurisprudential theory behind
which the substance of the privilege is lost. Ac-
cording to the majority opinion, a person accorded
use immunity is not dependent for the preservation
of his rights upon the integrity and good faith of
the prosecuting authorities. Rather, the prosecu-
tion has the affirmative duty to prove that the evi-
dence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate
source wholly independent of the compelled testi-
mony. Thus, the statute, by granting use immu-
nity, assures that the compelled testimony can in
no way lead to the infliction of criminal penalties.6
If the majority analysis is correct, then one who
testifies pursuant to a grant of use and derivative
use immunity will be in the same position vis-a-vis
the threat of prosecution and conviction as if he
had remained silent.0 If their analysis is wrong,
however, as Justice Marshall in his dissenting
opinion contends, then tainted evidence will, in
fact, pass into evidence and the substance of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion will be lost.
5' 406 U.S. at 453.1o What "uses" use immunity actually proscribes,
however, is open to debate. Could, for example, the
prosecution use for impeachment purposes testimony
given under a grant of use immunity? The Court's con-
traction of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), with regard
to an analogous situation points to an affirmitive re-
sponse.
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Standard of Proof in Voluntariness Hearings:
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972)
Although Jackson v. Denno' required a prelimi-
nary hearing by the judge on the voluntariness of a
criminal confession,2 it left undecided the standard
1378 U.S. 368 (1964).
, Jackson would allow a state to empanel a separatejury to decide the issue of voluntariness of a confession,
rather than leave it to the judge. Id. Judges however
may decide the issue. Reference to the "judge" in this
note will be a shorthand form for the fact-finder on the
issue of voluntariness, unless otherwise appropriate.
of proof to be applied at the hearing.3 In Lego v"
Twomey4 the Supreme Court resolved this issue
and held that the Constitution does not require a
confession to be ruled voluntary beyond a reason-
' But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Black, 378
U.S. at 405, in which he objectil that the Court should
then have determined the standard of proof to be
applied in the voluntariness hearing.
4 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
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able doubt. Therefore, the Illinois practice of ad-
mitting confessions into evidence if shown volun-
tary by a preponderance of the evidence was held
permissible.'
Prior to trial, petitioner Lego sought to have a
confession excluded because it was not made volun-
tarily. He testified that the police beat him into
confessing because the victim of the crime was a
friend of the police chief. The police denied the
beating. Lego's story was corroborated by a photo-
graph taken on the day after arrest showing his
face swollen and bloody, but was weakened by his
own testimony that he had had a scuffle with the
victim. The trial judge ruled the confession volun-
tary and admissible, concluding that the testimony
of the police chief and four police officers was
credible and Lego's was not.
6
The Illinois supreme court affirmed Lego's con-
viction in accordance with long-standing Illinois
law governing the admissibility of confessions
The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois denied Lego's petition for
habeas corpus,8 and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 9 Finally the Supreme
Court affirmed the denial of Lego's petition for
habeas corpus in a 4-3 decision, 0 with Justice
White writing the majority opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Blackmun. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting
opinion, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not take part
in the decision.
Lego first argued that he was not proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by In re
Winship," because the confession used against him
was proven voluntary by only a preponderance of
the evidence. Justice White, writing for the major-
ity, disagreed, believing that petitioner had failed
to show how a lower standard of proof on the pre-
liminary issue necessarily meant that on the ulti-
mate issue of innocence or guilt the state's higher
burden of proof was not met." Justice White
thought that the argument relied upon the faulty
I For a discussion of the "reasonable doubt" standard
as compared with the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard, see 9 J. WIGUO1E, EVIDENCE, §§2497-98
(3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WiGmoRE].
6 404 U.S. at 480 & n.2.
7People v. Lego, 32 I. 2d 76, 203 N.E.2d 875 (1965).
' United States ex rel. Lego v. Pate, 308 F. Supp.
38 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
9 The decision is unreported; United States ex rel.
Lego v. Pate, No. 18,313 (7th Cir. October 8, 1970).
10 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
"397 U.S. 358 (1970).
12404 U.S. at 486-87.
assumption that the reason for excludin'g involun-
tary confessions is that they make jury verdicts
less reliablej3 However, the Jackson hearing on the
voluntariness of a confession is not designed to in-
sure that the ultimate determination of innocence
or guilt is accurate,14 reasoned Justice White.
Rather, its sole purpose is to "police the police";
that is, to compel law enforcement authorities to
comply with the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused.1 5 The majority contended that a coerced
confession is excluded not because it is unreliable,
but only because the method used to obtain it vio-
lates the fifth amendment, whereas Winship im-
posed the higher standard for proof of guilt in order
to make jury verdicts more reliable and thereby
implement the presumption of innocence. 16 Justice
White did not see any connection between the re-
liability of the determination of innocence or guilt
and the reliability of the determination of whether
the police used constitutional methods.17 He was,
therefore, unconvinced that Winship threw any
light on the standard of proof to be used in deter-
mining the voluntariness of a confession.
Petitioner's second argument for the adoption of
the higher standard of proof was that it would give
better protection to the values which the exclu-
sionary rules are designed to serve.i Justice White
answered that the right to be free from coerced
confessions is not related to the standard of proof
for determining whether a confession is voluntary.
Furthermore, Justice White said, the petitioner
had not shown that constitutional rights would
suffer by the adoption of the lower standard of
proof, so there was no reason to expand the ex-
clusionary rules.1 9 In the absence of such a show-
ing, Justice White felt that it was open to specula-
tion whether the possible deterrence of unlawful
police conduct would be great enough to outweigh
the public interest in placing probative evidence
before the juries.' 0 In the face of this conjecture, he
would not adopt the higher standard of proof and
expand the exclusionary rules. Thus Justice White
saw the selection of the lower standard of proof as a
means to adequately accommodate two sets of val-
ues, and strike a balance between them.
Having rejected defendant's constitutional ar-
"3 Id. at 482.
"4 Id. at 484-85.
"1 Id. at 485.
16 Id. at 486-87.
17 Id. at 497.
18 Id.
11 Id. at 488.
2Id. at 489.
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guments,2' justice White felt the Court was left
with a question of evidence, and there was no rea-
son to require the states to settle it on anything but
traditional rules of evidence.n By those rules, the
standard of proof of facts governing admissibility
of evidence is unrelated to the standard of proof of
the ultimate facts in issue in the case. The standard
for the former is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.2
justice Brennan wrote a strong dissent, joined
by Justices Douglas and Marshall. Justice Brennan
saw the absolute language of the fifth amendment,
that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself," as
demanding unusual protection against admitting a
possibly involuntary confession, even at the risk
of excluding some voluntary confessions. 24 To
Justice Brennan, the fifth amendment commands
that an involuntary confession never be admitted,
and the Court had no choice but to take whatever
steps were necessary to meet that command. 5 Be-
cause in many instances the only evidence on the
issue of voluntariness is conflicting testimony of the
police and the defendant, the standard of proof
chosen will be controlling on the question of ad-
mission.28 In such cases, the dissent argued, the
higher standard is the only means to provide the
protection. that the fifth amendment demands to
insure that no involuntary confession ever be ad-
mitted.v
Justice Brennan drew support for his argument
from Winship, which for the first time placed the
traditional right to a presumption of innocence on a
firm constitutional basis. In that case, the consti-
tutional right to a presumption of innocence was
granted the protection of the reasonable doubt
standard, in order to give it "concrete substance." 2
In Lego, Justice Brennan quoted passages from
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Winship, in which
21 Petitioner's final attack upon his conviction con-
cemed his right to a jury determination of the con-
fession's voluntariness. He argued that even if thejudge ruled against him, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), required a jury determination of voluntari-
ness before the confession could be used against him.
The Court disagreed, stressing that Duncan was not
intended to change the rule that admissibility of evi-
dence was a question for the judge rather than the jury,
even when admissibility is attacked on Constitutional
grounds, 404 U.S. at 490.
22404 U.S. at 489.
2 3 WIGMORE §2550 n.6.
24 404 U.S. at 493.
25 Id. at 493-94.2 6 Id. at 492.
27id. at 493.2 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
Harlan argued that the higher standard of proof
should be chosen to implement the presumption of
innocence because it is far worse to convict an in-
nocent man than to let a guilty man go free. 9 To
justice Brennan the fifth amendment represents a
similar societal judgment that it is far worse to ad-
mit involuntary confessions than to exclude volun-
tary confessions. 0
It is the difference in outlook on the reasons for
the exclusionary rules that is crucial, and explains
the difference in outcome between the majority and
minority opinions in Lego. An unspoken premise of
the minority position is that the exclusionary
rules involve personal rights of the defendant, and
are not merely judicial tools for encouraging con-
stitutional practices. The dissent concluded that
the fifth amendment demanded a standard suffi-
cient to eliminate the risk of admission of involun-
tary confessions in all cases. But the majority, by
placing heavy emphasis on the deterrent value of
the exclusionary rules, sidestepped the question
whether there is a personal fifth amendment right
to the higher standard of proof. The majority de-
cided that there is only the possibility of deterring
unconstitutional practices by a judicial rule of a
high standard of proof of voluntariness. Justice
White's position implied that to impose a higher
standard of proof would be judicial legislation
which might possibly encourage constitutional
practices. But White did not feel the fifth amend-
ment compelled the Court to make this decision,
as did the minority.
In addition to highlighting the majority's con-
cept of the exclusionary rules, there is another
curious aspect to the majority opinion. Petitioner
argued that the Winship requirement of proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could not be
satisfied unless his confession were proven volun-
tary byr the same standard31 This argument is
based on two assumptions: first, that an involun-
tary confession uniquely affects the reliability
of a verdict both because of the special probative
force of a confession and because of the relation-
ship between voluntariness and reliability; and
second, that the Jackson hearing on voluntari-
ness is designed to keep those confessions from
juries because they are unreliable.
As to the first assumption, the majority conceded
that there is a relationship .between voluntariness
29404 U.S. at 493-94.
0 Id. at 494.3404 U.S. at 482.
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and the truth or falsity of a confessionn And,
given the probative force of a confession, if a con-
viction is based on a confession of questionable re-
liability, then the verdict itself may well be subject
to doubt and the accused's rights under Winship
may be violated." Yet Justice White did not be-
lieve that false confessions have a significant im-
pact on the validity of the verdict, arguing that the
jury is able to give the proper weight to a confession
if doubt is cast upon its voluntariness. Whether
juries can do this may be incapable of proof. How-
ever the history of exclusion of involuntary confes-
sions because of their unreliability 5 indicates a
judicial belief that juries are unable to give proper
weight to a confession of questionable voluntari-
ness. The Court in Jackson held that a jury is in-
capable of completely disregarding a convincing
confession which it finds definitely involuntary. 6
Seemingly it would be just as difficult for a jury to
discount a convincing confession of questionable
voluntariness.
With regard to the second assumption, that a
Jackson hearing on voluntariness is designed to
keep knowledge of involuntary confessions from a
jury because of their unreliability, Justice White
concluded that a Jackson hearing has nothing to do
with improving reliability of jury verdicts. Relying
on Jackson, he reasoned that coerced confessions
are excluded solely because of the method used to
obtain them." Jackson held that asking the jury
to determine both voluntariness and guilt by dis-
regarding a confession if they found it involuntary
was too great a burden because they might find
the confession involuntary, but nevertheless very
reliable, and they probably could not disregard
it.3 Thus Jackson represented only a shift in em-
phasis in the reasons for excluding involuntary
confessions, a shift from the question of unreliabil-
ity to the question of the legality of the police
" 404 U.S. at 484.
"The Winship requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt on the ultimate issue did not specifically
preclude a conviction based on doubtful evidence.
" 404 U.S. at 485-86.
35 See 3 WimORE §§822-23. While the 1970 edition
of this treatise by Chadbourn revised these sections in
order to conform to the recent shift away from the
theory of unreliability, see text accompanying note
39 infra, Wigmore's 1940 edition examines the exclu-
sion of involuni ry confessions from a historical view-
point. He traces the doctrine through more than two
centuries of judicial history and concludes that the
sole reason for excluding out-of-court confessions is
unreliability. 3 WIGMORO §823.
," Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 388-89.
7404 U.S. at 484-85.
"Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 388-89.
methods regardless of the reliability of the confes-
sion. Jackson did not reject unreliability"9 as a
reason for excluding involuntary confessions, but
merely added another more important reason, by
saying that the use of an involuntary confession 0
was prohibited even if it were reliable.
The Lego decision will not change the law in most
states. Many state courts which had considered the
issue prior to Lego held that only proof of volun-
tariness by a preponderance of the evidence is
necessary.a Others, adopting the higher standard
of proof, based their decisions on grounds that were
not entirely clear. In fact, some gave no reason for
their choice.4 These states, along with those that
adopted the higher standard incidental to their im-
plementation of Jackson,43 will now have an op-
portunity to reconsider whether their own state
law requires the reasonable doubt standard. Upon
reconsideration, state courts are free to require the
higher standard because Lego says only that the
states are not constitutionally mandated to do so.
Since many jurisdictions had already been using
the lower standard of proof, Lego's impact would
have been greater if it had required the standard of
19 Id. at 385-86 (emphasis added). The language of
Jackson makes it clear that unreliability, along with
U.1 unlawfulness of the method, remains a reason for
excluding involuntary confessions.
It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids the use of involuntary con-
fessions not only because of the probable unre-
liability of confessions that are obtained in a
manner deemed coercive ....
Id.
40 White's majority opinion in Lego acknowledged the
presence of this language, but discounted it. White
relied on a case prior to Jackson, Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961), for the proposition that the purpose
of a voluntariness hearing is not exclusion of unreliable
confessions. 404 U.S. at 484-85 n.12. It is true that
the emphasis in recent years has been on the exclusion
of involuntary confessions because of the method used,
3 WIGooP §822 (Chadbourn rev. 1970), but unreliabil-
ity has long been recognized as another reason. More-
over, some scholars have argued that the privilege
against legal compulsion to testify against oneself and
the rule of exclusion of involuntary out-of-court con-
fessions have a common pre-fifth amendment origin. L.
LEvY, OnoGums oF a FimH AmENDMENT, 495-97
n.43 (1968). Cf. Pittman, The Colonial and Constitu-
tional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
in America, 21 VA. L. Rxv. 763 (1935).
"See cases cited in 3 WiGmoRE §860a n.4 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1970) and in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at
479 n.l.
12 E.g., People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 78, 204
N.E.2d 179, 183 (1965).
13 See, e.g., State v. Thundershield, 83 S. Dak. 414,
422, 160 N.W.2d 408, 412 (1968); State ex rel. Good-
child v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 264, 133 2...2 72,
763-64 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1017 (1966).
[VCol. 63
